Fractal Ontology

Drive, Black Hole 2/10/1980  Original Source: https://www.revue-chimeres.fr/IMG/pdf/810210.pdf Translated by Taylor Adkins 7/22/20  F : Freud’s first topographical theories were quite science-based, neurophysiological; then, along the way, these models become quasi-anthropomorphic; the second topographical theory—the ego that struggles with the id and the grimacing personage of the superego—is presented somewhat as a description that a madman might come up with. As for the Kleinian (and other) extensions concerning the bad mother, that kind of unconscious is […]

F. Laruelle. “Programme.” La Décision philosophique 1 (1987): 5-43. Program translated by Taylor Adkins 7/2/20   A science for philosophy   Let’s suppose that we will formulate a project and that it will be necessary to exposit a program, this would be the manifesto: don’t do like philosophers, invent philosophy! Radically change its practice! Multiply its potentialities! Treat it experimentally as a whatever material! Is this possible? We are posing the problem otherwise: this is […]

Prolegomenas to Any Future Science That Would Present Itself as Human Laruelle. “Prolégomènes à toute science future qui se présenterait comme humaine.” La Décision philosophique 7 (1989: 7-37). Translated by Taylor Adkins An alternative to the conflict between philosophy and the human sciences   For those who endeavor to lay the foundations for a science of man, two already explored paths immediately come to mind. A new metaphysical and political version of man, a version […]

Toward a Science of Philosophical Decision   F. Laruelle. “Pour une science de la décision philosophique.” Editions Osiris (1987 : 25-40).   Translated by Taylor Adkins (6/16/20)   1. On Philosophy as Science’s Other   To introduce philosophy to science rather than science into philosophy: this task is already found to be posited with philosophy, which is its realization. It is therefore useless to posit it once again. To be a science by becoming one is […]

The Science of Phenomena and the Critique of Phenomenological Decision   F. Laruelle. “La Science des phénomenes et la critique de la décision phénoménologique.” Analecta Husserliana 34 (1991: 115-127). Translated by Taylor Adkins (6/15/20)  1. The Scientific Rectification of Phenomenology   Every science is “science of phenomena.” Yet how do we give a founded and rigorous content to the connection of science and phenomena as such, how do we articulate the one and the other […]

Original Source: https://www.revue-chimeres.fr/13-01-1981-Les-quatre-inconscients Translated by Taylor Adkins, 4/12/2020 Félix Guattari: I am always under a little pressure from M., who asks as frequently as possible for some examples. On the other hand, my concern would be to try to delve deeper into a certain number of theoretical themes. I will try to combine things: I will start with a whole gamut of categorization that I am proposing for assemblages; then I will read a previously […]

Bergen, Véronique.  L’Ontologie de Gilles Deleuze. L’Harmattan: Paris, 2001, 7-14. translated by Taylor Adkins and Lindsay Lerman   Introduction In the declination of “what is called thinking?” and “what does it mean to orient oneself in thinking?[i]”, the reflexive return to the operation of thinking is straightaway to establish–among other things–sometimes the image of a tribunal whose conditioning method confines the regulated exercise of thought to the harmonious circle of subject and object (Kant), sometimes the […]

Laruelle, François. “Homo ex Machina”, Revue Philosophique de la France et de l’Étranger, vol. 170, no. 3, 1980, pp. 325-342. Translated by Taylor Adkins Homo ex Machina How One Becomes Machine-Man We ordinarily recognize a single machine-Man1 tradition. But there are two, perhaps three; they appear the moment when the grouping of the objects of knowledge and history of ideas to which philosophy is accustomed is substituted for another grouping, that of the eras of […]